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Introduction
Currently, the world is watching a humanitarian crisis ensue, as on February 24th, 2022,
Russia invaded the sovereign nation of Ukraine. A humanitarian crisis, according to scholar
Taylor Seybolt, occurs when a community is deprived of essentials necessary to survive
(Seybolt, 2007, pg. 38). These essentials include “food, water, shelter, health care and protection
from violence” (Seybolt, 2007, pg. 38). The people of Ukraine are experiencing the extremity of
this deprivation. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) stated that since the
invasion in February, four million Ukrainians have fled the country and six and a half million
Ukrainians are displaced within the country (“Humanitarian Crisis in Ukraine and Neighboring
Countries,” 2022). Civilians in cities with high violence, such as Irpin and Mariupol, have no
food, water, shelter, electricity, or heat due to the destruction of homes and critical infrastructure,
and relief resources are not able to reach isolated and trapped civilians (ICRC, 2022).
Additionally, the crisis is spreading to neighboring states in the region, as Ukrainian refugees
pour into their borders. Before the invasion began and the humanitarian crisis quickly escalated,
President Biden deployed troops to some members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), Germany, Romania, and Poland, and made sure to state the reasoning for deployment:
to solely defend NATO allies in the region if they come into conflict with the Russian Federation
(The White House, 2022). It is now April of 2022, this policy has not changed. The White House
announced on March 24, 2022, that the United States was ready to “...provide more than one
billion [dollars] in new funding towards humanitarian assistance for those affected by Russia’s
war in Ukraine and its severe impacts around the world, including a marked rise in food
insecurity, over the coming months” (March 24, 2022). This will fund food supplies, water,
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medical supplies, and other necessary assistance that those impacted need (The White House,
March 25, 2022). Furthermore, President Biden announced an additional eight hundred million
in security assistance to Ukraine on April 13, 2022 (Estrin, 2022), bringing the total aid provided
to Ukraine to two billion dollars since the beginning of the Biden administration (The White
House, March 16, 2022).
From April 7 to April 11, polling firm Dynata, in cooperation with Quinnipiac
University Poll, surveyed 1,256 American adults about the conflict in Ukraine (Malloy and
Schwartz, 2022). When asked if the United States has a moral responsibility to do more to stop
the killing of civilians in Ukraine, 68% of respondents said that the United States does have a
responsibility, while 24% said that it does not and 8% said that they were unsure or did not
respond (Malloy and Schwarts, 2022). Additionally, when the respondents were asked which
perspective most fit their view of the conflict, 19% said that the United States should provide
more support to Ukraine, even if it increases the risk of war with Russia; 52% said to provide
more support to Ukraine, yet not to the extent where it will increase the chance of war with
Russia; and 22% said that the United States is already providing the right amount of support
(Malloy and Schwartz). It was observed that the American public sees Ukraine’s dire need for
help, but President Biden has not inserted the United States as a militaristic actor in the conflict
to stop the humanitarian crisis. This discrepancy raises questions about the differences in
motivations to intervene in humanitarian crises between the American public and the American
president and the public’s influence on the president’s decision to intervene.
So, does American public opinion influence the President of the United States’ decision
to militarily intervene in humanitarian crises? To examine this, the research will analyze the
alignment of humanitarian strategies between the American public and the American president,
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which will expose the motivations of the public’s approach to intervention and the motivations of
the president’s approach to intervention. Within the exposed motivations, it is expected to find
that national interest is the most influential motivator in determining whether or not to intervene
militaristically. Moral obligation is the other motivator expected to be found when shaping
opinions and approaches for humanitarian intervention, but it is not expected for moral
obligation motives to trigger the President to authorize militaristic intervention. Thus, it is
expected to find that national interest is a necessary motivator for the President to intervene
militaristically on humanitarian grounds. Since the national interest motivator must be the
President’s motive for intervention and there is no necessary motivation on the American
public’s side that incites militaristic intervention, it is expected that public opinion will not
influence the President’s decision on humanitarian intervention. Moral obligation may also be
an additional motive subsequent to national interest, but it will not incite the authorization of
militaristic intervention alone.
With this expected finding, the research estimates seven variations of motivations and
outcomes by the public and the President, which can be seen in Table 1. The first variation
assumes that if both the public and the President see national interest as a motive supporting
militaristic intervention, then it is possible for militaristic intervention to occur. The second
variation assumes that if both the public and the President sees moral obligation as a motive
supporting humanitarian intervention, then it is expected that militaristic intervention will not
occur. The third variation assumes that if the public sees a moral obligation motive to
militaristically intervene and the President sees a national interest motive in support of
intervention, then it is possible that militaristic intervention will occur. The fourth variation
assumes that if the public sees a national interest motive in support for intervention and the
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President sees a moral obligation motive, then it is expected that militaristic intervention will not
occur. The fifth variation assumes that if the public sees a moral obligation motive to
militaristically intervene and the President sees both national interest and moral obligation
motives in support of intervention, then it is possible that militaristic intervention will occur. The
sixth variation assumes that if the public has both a national interest and moral motive to
militaristically intervene and the President solely has a national interest motive in support of
militaristic intervention, then it is possible that militaristic intervention will occur. Lastly, the
eighth variation assumes that if the public sees both national interest and moral motives in
support of militaristic intervention and the President only sees a moral obligation, then it is
expected that militaristic intervention will not occur.
Table 1.
Motivations and its Expected Outcomes
The Public’s Motive

The President’s Motive

Expected Intervention
Response

National Interest

National Interest

Possible Militaristic
Intervention

Moral Obligation

Moral Obligation

No Militaristic Intervention

Moral Obligation

National Interest

Possible Militaristic
Intervention

National Interest

Moral Obligation

No Militaristic Intervention

Moral Obligation

National Interest/Moral
Obligation

Possible Militaristic
Intervention

National Interest/Moral
Obligation

National Interest

Possible Militaristic
Intervention

National Interest/Moral
Obligation

Moral Obligation

No Militaristic Intervention
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The United States is a known active and influential state in the international community
and historically has participated in humanitarian interventions around the world through
humanitarian aid, diplomacy, threats of sanctions, threats of the use of force, and military
assistance. The definition of humanitarian intervention that will be used for the context of the
paper comes from scholar Johnathan Moore. He defined humanitarian intervention as, “...action
by international actors across national boundaries including the use of military force taken with
the objective of relieving severe and widespread human suffering and violation of human rights
within states where local authorities are unwilling or unable to do so” (Moore, 2007, pg. 169).
Humanitarian crises that create the need for intervention include disasters that are man-made and
natural, along with outbreaks of diseases. Man-made disasters include armed conflict, forced
displacement, and mass refugee flows (Kohrt, et.al. 2019). Natural disasters include
unpredictable events such as hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, and droughts (Kohrt, et.al. 2019).
Unfortunately, most severe humanitarian crises have multiple of these events occurring
simultaneously. Yet, as seen in the Ukraine case, the United States does not always intervene
militarily when large scale human rights atrocities and human suffering occur.
By analyzing American public opinion of the humanitarian cases of Darfur, Sudan in
2007, Libya in 2011, and Syria in 2013, the motivations of the American public on humanitarian
intervention can be better understood. The analysis of public opinion is an important indicator, as
the core of democracy in the United States is rooted in the voices of the people in both domestic
and foreign affairs. American democracy was founded on the idea of proclaiming unalienable
rights in 1776, which has led to a longstanding tradition of the United States being a “beacon of
human rights” around the world (Schlesinger, 1978, pg. 505). It has been argued that this
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foundation has created a national identity, linking the United States to humanitarian intervention
overtime (Donnelly, 2013).
Throughout the rest of the paper, starting with the literature review, there will be further
explanations from scholars regarding the four types of humanitarian interventions, national
interest and morality as motivations to intervene, why interventions occur, and how public
opinion on foreign policy is shaped. The following section lays out three case studies of
humanitarian intervention in Sudan, Libya, and Syria. Of the three cases, only Libya had a
militaristic intervention outcome. Speeches from American presidents to the American people
are used to depict the crisis and used to give a timeline of events that occurred as the crisis
unfolded. The discussion that follows looks at the empirical evidence observed from the case
studies in connection with scholarship from the literature review, which sees if the expected
findings were shown. Finally, the conclusion goes over the two main findings of the study, which
are that public opinion does not impact the decision of the United States to militaristically
intervene and national interest must be a necessary condition for militaristic intervention to
occur. Additionally, the limitations of application of the study will be stated.

Literature Review
Types of Humanitarian Interventions
According to Seybolt (2007), governments’ interventions on humanitarian grounds have
different considerations, strategies, and goals. In general, there are two considerations that
governments must address: humanitarian considerations and political considerations. (Seybolt,
2007, pg. 40). Humanitarian considerations include addressing the lack of essential necessities
that are needed to survive, such as food and water, and addressing the violence that the victims
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are facing. Political considerations specifically focus on the victims and the perpetrators
(Seybolt, 2007, pg. 40). Simply, humanitarian considerations focus on the “what” aspect of
intervention and political considerations focus on the “who” aspect of intervention. In creating a
humanitarian intervention response, whether militaristic or not, humanitarian considerations and
political considerations must be used together.
The strategies for humanitarian intervention according to Seybolt (2007) include
avoidance, deterrence, defense, compellence and offense (Humanitarian Military Intervention:
The Conditions for Success and Failure). Avoidance is simply defined as the “conscious effort
not to engage an adversary in hostile confrontation” (Seybolt, 2007, pg. 40). The strategy of
deterrence is the threat of taking forceful action if a specific action is taken by the adversary
(Seybolt, 2007). The threat must be thought to be credible by the opponent for the strategy to
succeed (Seybolt, 2007). The defense strategy is the physical action of using force to protect
“something or someone” from an action that the adversary is taking (Seybolt, 2007, pg. 41).
Compellence has the specific goal of persuading the adversary to exhibit “good behavior” and it
is not used to “destroy the opponent” (Seybolt, 2007, pg. 41). The compellence strategy can be
used by either the threat of the use of force or the actual use of force. Once the “good behavior”
is exemplified by the adversary, the threats or the use of force will cease (Seybolt, 2007, pg. 41).
The last strategy of offense must include the use of force and has the intention of defeating the
opponent or occupying a specific place (Seybolt, 2007). Seybolt (2007) says that offensive action
is rare when trying to save people, but it is not impossible (Humanitarian Military Intervention:
The Conditions for Success and Failure).
With these considerations and strategies in mind, Seybolt (2007) argues that there are
four types or goals of humanitarian intervention: assisting aid delivery, protecting aid operations,
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saving victims, and defeating perpetrators (Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions
for Success and Failure). None of these types of interventions are exclusive from one another, as
there can be multiple types of interventions occurring at the same time, but each requires
different strategies to achieve the desired goal. The first type of humanitarian intervention, an
intervention with the exclusive goal of assisting in aid delivery, has a humanitarian consideration
of addressing essential needs of those suffering and requires the strategy of avoiding conflict.
The political consideration is focused on the victims (Seybolt, 2007, pg. 40). The second type of
humanitarian intervention, intervention with the exclusive goal of protecting aid operations, has
the humanitarian consideration of providing those suffering with essential needs, but the political
consideration is now on the perpetrator. The strategies required include deterrence and defense to
ensure that the aid gets to the victims (Seybolt, 2007, pg. 40). The third type of humanitarian
intervention, intervention with the exclusive objective to save the victims, has the humanitarian
consideration of addressing the violence and a political consideration focused on the victims,
causing the strategies to include deterrence, defense, and compellence (Seybolt, 2007, pg. 40).
Lastly, the fourth type of intervention, intervention with the exclusive objective to defeat the
perpetrator, has the humanitarian consideration of addressing the violence and the political
consideration of focusing on the perpetrator. Strategies then change to include offense, along
with compellence (Seybolt, 2007, pg. 40).
The expected findings of this study rely on this categorization model of humanitarian
intervention, as the research will be using the objectives and strategies to determine the
American public’s and the American president’s motivations to intervene. Then, comparison of
the two groups' motivations can occur, allowing the research to assume whether a militaristic
intervention will occur. It is expected to find that if the political consideration in a humanitarian
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intervention is focused on the victims, the first and third approaches to intervention, then the
motive to militaristically intervene would be a moral motive. If the political consideration is
focused on the perpetrator, the second and fourth types of intervention, then it is expected to find
that the motive of intervention is out of national interest.
Types of Motivation Used for Humanitarian Intervention: National Interest
There is a debate among scholars regarding which school of thought explains why the
United States takes part in humanitarian intervention: realism or liberalism. Starting with
realism, scholars in this school of thought generally have a pessimistic take towards the
international system (Yoshida, 2018). Offensive realist scholars believe that states intervene in
another country’s affairs to gain power on the international level, thus benefiting their national
interests. On the other hand, defensive realist scholars believe that a country intervenes
specifically to protect the national interest that the state already has (Yoshida, 2018). Yet, these
theorists have differing opinions on which identifiable factors cause national interest to be their
motivations. Hans Morgenthau, a traditional neoclassical realist, says that human nature itself is
power seeking (1967). He wrote, “Intervene we must where our national interest requires it and
where our power gives us a chance to succeed. The choice of these occasions will be
determined…by a careful calculation of the interest involved and the power available”
(Morgenthau, 1967). In the neorealist theory, led by Kenneth Waltz, scholars believe that
national interest is a motivator because the international system is anarchic (2010). With no
overlooking world government controlling or monitoring the actions of independent states, there
is no hierarchical order. This forces states to act in their interest because they are in a self-help
system (Forsyth, 2011). Therefore, under these realist perspectives, humanitarian interventions
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are not initiated because of the humanitarian crises that are occurring in another country, but they
are initiated because of the need to protect their interests or gain more interests (Donnelly, 2013).
The 1994 American intervention in Haiti that avoided large flows of refugees to the
United States and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to secure American oil supply are examples of the
differing realist perspectives (Choi, 2013). In 1994, under the Clinton administration, the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized the first resolution that allowed the use of force to
restore democracy and peace to a member nation of the United Nations: Haiti (Office of the
Historian, n.d.). Operation Uphold Democracy, the official name of the Haitian mission, had the
goal of reinstituting the first popularly elected government of Jean- Bertrand Aristide back into
office, as a coup overthrew him in September, 1991. The non-democratic Haiti threatened the
democratization and economic development of Haiti and nations in the Caribbean, causing the
United States and other UNSC members to see this as a threat to their economic and political
interests. Thus, Operation Uphold Democracy was created out of defensive realist motives. By
removing the military led government and reinstating the Aristide government, threats of an
increase in instability in the Haitian economy and a large influx of Haitian refugees coming to
the United States were prevented, saving the United States from addressing these threats (Office
of the Historian, n.d.).
The humanitarian intervention in Iraq in 2003 depicts the offensive realist theory. In
general, there are many debated factors as to why the United States decided to intervene in Iraq,
such as the country’s link to terrorism, ridding of any possibility for Iraq to create weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), and the United States wanting to visibly show its military might
(Heinrich, 2015). But, the United States also needed to secure more open relations with Iraq to
ensure American access to Iraqi oil supply (Heinrich, 2015). Although securing oil supply was
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an unofficial reason for the intervention, it was an important motivator. This depicts offensive
realism in that the United States acted forcefully to gain a benefit that they previously did not
have: access to the second largest oil supply in the world (Heinrich, 2015). The other
determining factors of Iraq providing support to terrorism and creating weapons of mass
destruction, would incite defensive realist responses, as the United States was acting militarily to
prevent new threats of terror attacks and widespread killings using WMD.
By analyzing the case studies chosen, it is expected to find that the United States
President will authorize militaristic intervention on humanitarian grounds when the President
sees national interest as a motive to intervene. Specifically, it is expected to find that if either
offensive or defensive realist motives are present, then intervention will occur. From 2008 to
2013, the United States was still involved in actions limiting global terrorism and ensuring that
the United States will never endure another terrorist attack similar to 9/11. American national
security, a national interest motive at the forefront of this foreign policy agenda, incites both
offensive and defensive realist actions. Humanitarian crises specifically would provoke these
actions if governments who are actively creating the crisis are negatively impacting or have the
potential to negatively impact the security of nations outside of their borders.
Types of Motivation Used for Humanitarian Intervention: Morality
The moral argument for humanitarian intervention in its most simplest form is that by
partaking in intervention, it shows fundamental respect to other human beings. According to
Rorty, human solidarity, or the mutual respect of human beings that is within every person, is our
essential humanity (1989). This theory is at the core of the human rights and humanitarianism, as
when people purposefully avoid addressing brutal attacks, genocides, and human rights abuses,
they are deemed inhumane (Rorty, 1989). Thus, they are not acting to the fullness of their

13

humanity and respecting others as human beings (Rorty, 1989). With this, all humanitarian crises
are supposed to create moral outrage universally, causing there to be some type of intervention
out of respect for those suffering. Along similar lines, classical liberals believe individuals have
fundamental natural rights, but they also believe that each person has the right to liberty,
property, and ethical treatment (Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay, 2008).
On the other hand, the focus of contemporary liberal internationalists is to explain how
intervention based on national interest is not a determining factor in humanitarian interventions.
Walzer (2010), a theorist in this section of liberalism, states that humanitarian interventions must
be multilateral operations with given authorization by the United Nations Security Council
(Doyle and Recchia, 2011). Through multilateralism and authorization from an international
organization, contemporary liberal internationalists believe that it prevents states from acting on
the basis of national interest, as a state cannot only take into account their interests when
working with another state or organization (Doyle and Recchia, 2011). Additionally, working
with international organizations who have a focus on humanitarian work will influence the acting
state to promote humanitarian relief as its motivator (Doyle and Recchia, 2011).
Yet, although the fundamental aspect of humanity would call for intervention out of this
moral element, there is a variance in when the United States decides to intervene. The variance
of intervention can be explained by the common humanity theory. This view states that a nation
is only responsible for the security and welfare of its own citizens and the state’s moral duties are
thus limited only to those citizens (Rorty, 1989). Under this view, the United States has no moral
requirement to help those in humanitarian crises in other nations, yet it does create the option for
them to choose when to intervene. The responsibility to protect doctrine, or R2P, is a liberal
principle that gives member states of the United Nations the ability to intervene if they see fit.
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The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty created the doctrine due to
the insufficient responses to genocides and ethnic cleansings that took place in the 1990s,
referring to the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. The non-interference of sovereignty
principle arguably halted outside countries from stepping in (Thakur, 2011). R2P, according to
the ICISS, has three elements: “...states have the primary responsibility to protect their citizens
from crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and war crimes, the international
community has the responsibility to assist states in fulfilling their responsibility to protect
citizens, and the international community has the responsibility to react to human rights
violations if states are unable or unwilling to fulfill their responsibility through political or
economic sanctions, and use of force as a last resort” (Bellamy, 2010). This doctrine is said to
have emerged out of the idea of moral responsibility, but some scholars question the claim.
Moses critiques the responsibility to protect from a realist perspective. With the
permanent members of the UNSC consisting of China, the United States, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and France, realists argue that the decision to intervene does not represent the entire
international community (2013). With these five countries being consistently involved in crises
and expected to respond through the United Nations, they are able to let more of their national
interests influence them. The other ten countries in the security council, the non-permanent
members, are regarded as not having enough consistent influence in interventions and do not
have the power to veto decisions. Therefore, not all of the regions are represented and the
national interest of specific nations is able to be identified (Moses, 2013). Additionally, some
realists say that national interests are more important than moral duty, making them less likely to
respond in the principle of responsibility to protect (Yoshida, 2013).
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Based on this literature, it is expected to find that there may be apparent moral
motivations for militaristic humanitarian intervention by both the American public and the
American President, but the moral motivations alone will not be enough to authorize a
militaristic operation. Therefore, if moral motives are the sole motivators among the public and
the President, militaristic intervention will not occur. The absence of a doctrine requiring any
type of humanitarian intervention in the international community in addition to the United States
aligning with the common humanity theory and agreeing to the R2P doctrine allows for the
United States to intervene when they deem it necessary, regardless of moral motives.
Public Opinion on Intervention
Historically, there has been a debate in literature on whether public opinion within
democracies had a measurable impact on foreign policy decisions (Soroka, 2003). According to
earlier literature, it was believed that public opinion on foreign policy related issues was not
reliable, as their opinions were “volatile and lacked coherent structure,” while assuming that the
public mainly followed and agreed with the decisions that elites made (Almond 1950, Lipset
1966). In the 1990s, scholars started recognizing that public opinion on foreign policy was
constant, as the public’s individual and collective behavior is “efficient and rational” (Page and
Shapiro 1992, Popkin 1994). Although the latter perspective is becoming more recognized, there
is not a widespread consensus among scholars that makes it the most prominent approach.
(Soroka, 2003).
The United States, being one of the permanent members of the UNSC and one of the
most active interventionists in the international community, has a democratic foundation that
recognizes public opinion when making decisions regarding foreign policy. This includes
humanitarian intervention. In general, when there is public support for humanitarian intervention,
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it means that Americans believe that it is in the United States’ interest to protect foreign civilians
and the cost is worth it (Kreps and Maxey, 2018). But what causes Americans to think this way?
Goldsmith and Posner show that instrumental calculations are used within humanitarian
interventions (2005). If these instrumental calculations are the main drivers of interventions, the
government must convince the public that the cost of deployment will be low and national
interest is at stake (Goldsmith and Posner, 2005). Other literature says that moral obligation is at
the forefront of public opinion. With this perception, evidence of human suffering and violence
would be sufficient evidence to gain support for intervention (Finnemore, 2003).
By looking at this literature on public opinion on intervention, it is expected to see that
the formation of public opinion on militaristic intervention was formed by instrumental
calculations, such as cost and benefit. With these instrumental calculations forming opinions, the
opinion will be created with national interest in mind rather than moral obligation. If moral
obligation was at the forefront of opinion, then costs and benefits would be taken into account.
Yet, during 2008 to 2013, American foreign policy had shifted to be very security focused,
causing the United States’ actions to be even more focused on national interest rather than
morality. By looking at the case study analysis and public opinion analysis of Sudan, Libya, and
Syria from 2008 to 2013, the national interest and the moral motives in support of intervention
by the public and the President will be revealed. It is predicted that when the President has
national interest motives to intervene, there will be a militaristic intervention. Additionally, it is
expected to see public opinion not play a role in the decision to intervene, as only the President’s
national interest motive is necessary for militaristic intervention to occur.
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Case Studies
The scholarship has shown that there are two main motives involved in humanitarian
intervention, national interest and moral obligation, and there are debates as to which is used
during these crises. Regardless of the debate, it is possible for both national interest and moral
obligation to create high public support for humanitarian intervention. The research examines
which motive receives the most support for humanitarian intervention, but based on the literature
presented, there is an expectation that there will be more public support for humanitarian
intervention based on the grounds of national interest.
In this section, cases of humanitarian intervention from 2008 to 2013 will be examined,
including the United States’ response to the ethnic cleansing in Sudan, the United States’
response against the Qaddafi regime in Libya, and the United States response to the al-Assad
regime in Syria. Each case study is presented chronologically. Each step the United States chose
to take during the humanitarian crises comes from the White House archives of George W. Bush
and Barack Obama, which contain transcripts of speeches and press releases from each president
during the time of the crises. The answers and addresses to the American public give insight to
the president's motivations and reasons as to why intervention should or should not occur.
Additionally, by breaking down each decision leading up to the final decision to intervene or not,
it allows for analysis of public opinion at different points in time during the crisis. Changes in
public support for intervention will then be more apparent.
These cases were chosen due to the use of multilateralism and the final decision on
whether to intervene on the behalf of the United States. Multilateralism, specifically
authorization by the UNSC, is a necessary element for an acceptable intervention in the
international community, but it is not a sufficient element to cause intervention. This allows for a
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comparison of similar cases with different outcomes. Also, if each case was not at this standard,
the motivations found would have taken the research away from specific motivations to
intervene on humanitarian grounds, as the research would be led in the direction of finding the
motivations as to why multilateralism should or should not be used. The second reason these
three humanitarian crises were chosen was due to the United States’ different response method
and how it aligned with the American public’s support for intervention. The case in Sudan ended
with a low militaristic response by the United States, yet militaristic intervention had very high
support by the American people. The case in Libya had a high militaristic response by the United
States, but moderately low public support for military intervention. Lastly, in the case of Syria,
there was a low militaristic response by the United States and low support for militaristic
intervention by the American people. With each case having varying outcomes which did or did
not align with public opinion, it creates a broad study that will help show differences or
similarities in motivations across studies. The study may also show findings that are
contradictory to the research question. The motivations expected to be found are national interest
and moral obligation, yet it is possible that neither of these motives will be found in the three
cases examined, or that there may be a mix of both within the three cases.
Table 2.
Public Support of Intervention Compared with U.S. Response
Case Study

Amount of Public
Support

United States
Response

Did public support
align with the U.S.
Response?

Sudan, 2003

Majority in favor of
using force

Sent humanitarian
aid and supported
United Nations
peacekeeping forces

No

Libya, 2011

Low support for use

Force was used:

No
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Syria, 2013

of force

multilateral airstrikes

Low support for use
of force

Diplomacy:
implementation of a
United Nations
weapons monitoring
program

Yes

The method of surveying consisted of questioning through telephone calls and
questioning through a fully online platform. With the expansion of technology occurring from
2004 to 2014, polling centers and networks who fielded the studies, such Zogby America,
Knowledge Networks, Princeton Survey Research Associates International, Gallup Poll, Globe
Scan, and the Program on International Policy Attitudes, were able to incorporate online surveys
rather than solely using the telephone method. Random sampling was used in each survey and
each of the respondents were paneled based on whether households had a telephone. This
included either a landline or a cellular phone. For those surveys that were solely using an internet
platform, each polling network made sure to not have over-representation of respondents with
computers in the household. Therefore, they continued to do their random sampling using
telephone paneling and provided all households willing to participate with the internet and a
computer to fill out the survey. The data from the Sudan case study was collected by a mixture of
telephone interviews and internet surveys from 2004 to 2008. In data presented from the Libya
case study, all of the surveys used were conducted by telephone interviews in 2011. Similarly, all
of the surveys administered for the Syria case study were telephone interviews conducted from
2012 to 2013.
Limitations that can come about when using telephone interviews is the mode effect and
the recency effect. The mode effect is when the respondents of a survey are less likely to be
honest in their answers on sensitive topics. The method of surveying face to face or through
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telephone interviews makes it more likely for respondents to not give their honest answers, as
there is a slight pressure put on the respondent by having another person conduct the survey
(Kennedy, 2019). Honest answers by the respondent may offend people or hurt the respondent’s
reputation, making it more likely for them to change their answer to present themselves as a
good person (Keeter, 2015). Examples of sensitive questions have to do with family life, social
life, income, and minority groups, but it has also been shown that political questions create this
effect, too, as a result of social desirability bias. For example, when asked if George W. Bush
was very favorable, favorable, unfavorable, or very unfavorable in a split survey with 1,509
internet surveys and 1,494 telephone surveys, 22% of phone interviews said that he was very
unfavorable compared to the 31% of the internet surveys (Keeter, 2015). Additionally, 19% of
phone interview respondents said that Hillary Clinton was very unfavorable, whereas 27% of
internet survey respondents said that she was very unfavorable (Keeter, 2015).
Another limitation that may come as a consequence of the method of polling has to do
with the wording of the questions, the wording of the responses, and the length of the responses.
When partaking in a telephone interview, there are complex questions that may not be fully
understood when read aloud to a respondent. Additionally, the respondent must understand the
answer choices and have to attempt to remember each choice as they are being read through.
Thus, the recency effect comes into play, where the last answer choice is favored (Keeter, 2015).
Respondents taking an internet survey are less inclined to run into trouble with complex
questions and answers, as they can reread and take the time to understand each.
The difference in outcomes of telephone surveys and internet surveys is important to note
when looking at the case studies presented. With telephone interviews being the sole surveying
method in the Libya case study and the Syria case study, it must be kept in mind that there may
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be answers that do not truly reflect the respondents true thoughts, as there are risks of the
respondent misunderstanding the question and the respondent answering with one of the lasts
questions they heard. In the Sudan case study, both telephone interviews and internet surveys
were used in the research. Regardless, these random samples allow for the research to have
public opinion data on the entire American population, without having to survey the entire
population.
Another factor that many also affect public opinion are prior events. The last military
intervention on humanitarian grounds that the United States pursued before the three cases
presented was the invasion of Iraq in March of 2003. This invasion under the Bush
administration is highly contested for being motivated on humanitarian grounds, as some
humanitarians say that it failed to meet the standard of humanitarianism (“War in Iraq: Not a
Humanitarian Intervention,” 2004). The Bush administration was adamant about removing
Saddam Hussein from office to set the Iraqi people free, ridding all weapons of mass destruction
from Iraq, and protecting those innocent civilians and neighboring countries from the use of
those weapons (Bush, March 18, 2003). Yet, as Human Rights Watch noted, there were no
ongoing killings or imminent threats to Iraqi civilians by weapons of mass destruction.
Therefore, there was no threat to the Iraqi people at the time and it delegitimized the need for
militaristic intervention. The Iraq war was not primarily about saving civilians, which hurt the
United States’ justification of the military invasion and it only made the motive of national
interest and security more apparent (“War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention,” 2004).
The Iraq war being the last militaristic humanitarian intervention by the United States is
important to note before diving into the cases of Sudan, Libya, and Syria. The United States
declaring war on terrorism after the 2001 terrorist attacks gives context into why the motives
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regarding support of militaristic intervention in Iraq was high. This shift in American foreign
policy also heavily impacts the expected findings of the case studies. Declaring a war on terror in
response to the United States enduring the aftermath of the 2001 tragedies shows that the United
States had their national security at the forefront of their foreign policy. Additionally, American
allies’ security was prioritized also, as it was in the national interest of the United States. When
an American ally is attacked by a perpetrator, there is immediate damage to the security of the
United States, as they lose an able partner that helps ensure the United States’ security. This, in
addition with the Iraq war, makes it expected to find that from 2003 to 2013, militaristic
intervention will likely take place if national interest is at stake, as American resources are being
saved and prioritized for those occurrences due to shifts in foreign policy.
Case Study: Darfur, Sudan 2003
The poor conditions of the Sudanese government in 2003 originated not only from
continuous historical conflict, but from the specific transition of leadership to Omar Hassan
Ahmad al-Bashir in 1989. Al-Bashir led a military coup that removed Prime Minister Sadiq alMahdi from office on June 30, 1989, which allowed al-Bashir to take control of the government
and implement the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) as the main political coalition (“The
Republic of the Sudan,” n.d.). One of the primary goals of the new leadership was to forcefully
influence the Sudanese people to live under Islamic law and standards, which created a divide
between northern and southern Sudanese regions. Northern Sudan at the time had a population
that was largely Muslim, whereas southern Sudan held more Christian and animist populations
(“The Republic of the Sudan,” n.d.). Since the forceful transition of power, the international
community recognized and condemned human rights abuses that occurred in the country, such as
the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International condemnations in 1998. Political violence
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continued to be prevalent with recognizable clashes in the cities of Omdurman in 2000, Kassala
and Aroma in 2001, and between the ethnic tribes al-Muaalia and Reizagat in 2002 (“The
Republic of the Sudan,” n.d.).

Figure 1.
Timeline of President Bush’s Actions in Sudanese Humanitarian Crisis

In 2003, black African Muslims of the western Darfur region retaliated against the Arab
Muslim leadership. The rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality
Movement, demanded new development and infrastructure in the region, to stop government’s
arming of ethnic Sudanese Arabs, to work to bridge the economic inequality between African
Muslims and non-African Muslims, and to allow for equal representation of Africans and Arabs
in the government (Sudan: Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur, Archives 2004). Instead of making
reforms to help these communities, the Sudanese government responded by arming 20,000 Arab
militiamen. The militia, known as the Janjaweed, operated mutually with the government, who
allowed for the mass killings of civilians from the Fur, Masaalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups
(Sudan: Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur, Archives 2004).
On September 21, 2004, President George W. Bush gave a speech to the United Nations
General Assembly, where he stated that the American government had deemed Sudan’s crimes a
genocide (United Nations General Assembly Address, G. W. Bush September 2004). He urged
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the government to stop the killing in Darfur and stated that the United States was sending
humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese people (United Nations General Assembly Address, G.
W. Bush September 2004). But, according to a public opinion poll from the Department of State
in 2005, a majority of the American public believed that the best solution was a multilateral
United Nations operation, which would “step in with military force to stop the violence in
Darfur” (Relief Web). 61% of Americans supported a military intervention, while 32% opposed
it (Relief Web). Additionally, from a public opinion survey from Zogby International in 2005, it
was found that of the 84% of American respondents who were in favor of using American
military assets and believed that the United States should not tolerate extremist governments,
81% of them were in favor of implementing tough sanctions against Sudanese leaders
(International Crisis Group). Similarly, 80% of them were in favor of a no-fly zone (International
Crisis Group).
On September 19, 2006, during his United Nations address, President Bush urged the
international community to aid those suffering in Darfur through humanitarian aid and by
strengthening the African Union, the peacekeeping force that was in Sudan at the time
(“Transcript of Bush U.N. Speech,” CNN). Bush asked NATO members to provide logistical
support, such as transportation and supplies, to increase the effectiveness of the force and also
announced Andrew Natsios, a former USAID administrator, as the presidential special envoy to
aid in settling disagreements in the Sudanese crisis and help bring those agents in conflict to
peace agreements (“Transcript of Bush U.N. Speech,” CNN). At this time, public support for
military intervention had decreased, but a majority of Americans were still in support of it. When
asked if they favored or opposed the use of American troops as a part of a multinational force to
help end the ethnic genocide in a Pew Research Center poll in 2006, 53% of respondents favored
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the use of troops, 38% opposed the use of troops, and 9% either “did not know” or refused to
answer (Pew Research Center, 2006).
It was not until April 18, 2007, that President Bush discussed more aggressive steps the
United States would take to bring peace to western Sudan. At this point in time, over 200,000
civilians had died from the conflict and two million people had fled from the country (White
House Archives). With help from the United States, the Sudanese government and the largest
rebel group came to a positive agreement where the government would stop arming the
Janjaweed and would also punish those who violated the cease-fire. The rebel group agreed to
dispersing into designated areas around Sudan (White House Archives). To the international
community, this agreement brought optimism for peace and stability in Sudan. Additionally, a
new agreement was authorized by the United States, the United Nations, the African Union, the
European Union, the government of Sudan, and twelve other nations that strengthened the ceasefire agreement and created a United Nations and African Union joint peacekeeping operation to
be enacted to increase the number of peacekeepers patrolling Sudan (White House Archives).
Overtime, these agreements were violated by the Sudanese government as arms continued to
flow to the Janjaweed militia and more civilians were killed. It was then that President Bush
urged President Bashir to meet his commitments or else the United States would block American
dollar transactions from Sudan in the United States financial system, sanction individuals found
committing human rights violations, cut violent actors access to the American financial system,
put an embargo on American arm sales to Sudan, and prohibit Sudanese military flights over
Darfur (White House Archives). On May 29, 2007, President Bush implemented those sanctions.
Shortly after the Presidents threat of sanctions in April, President Bashir of Sudan bombed a
meeting where rebel commanders were deliberating on making peace with the government
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(White House Archives May 2007). Additionally, he continued to support attacks on rebels and
civilians, he opposed the peacekeeping force coming into the country, and did not not take any
steps to disarm the government backed militias (White House Archives May 2007). Interestingly,
public opinion on the genocide in Darfur changed within two years. In 2007, Americans were
less likely to be in favor of the United States’ partaking in a multilateral military intervention, as
only 45% favored it (Rosentiel, 2007). This can be explained by compassion fatigue, meaning
that interest in the issue lessened due to the assumption that African states are constantly in a
cycle of violence.
The American government deemed genocide in Darfur continued to be an international
crisis in 2008, as new peacekeeping forces had to be implemented. The United Nations Security
Council adopted resolution 1769 in July, which authorized the United Nations African Union
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and added support to the small African Union Mission in Darfur
(AMIS) (U.S. Response to the Situation in Darfur 2008). The United States continued to support
the peacekeeping mission and provided humanitarian assistance to those in the Darfur region.
From 2005 to 2008, the United States provided $4 billion in humanitarian, development, and
peacekeeping assistance, along with $100 million to equip and train those a part of UNAMID,
constructed 34 base camps for peacekeepers in Darfur, and provided 40,000 metric tons of food
monthly to Sudan (U.S. Response to the Situation in Darfur 2008). This was the full extent of the
United States’ aid to Sudan, which ultimately did not include military intervention.
As it was presented, the United States provided large amounts of humanitarian aid and
was dedicated to strengthening peacekeeping forces in Sudan, but in the end, the United States
government did not respond in the way that the American public wanted. There was a change in
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public opinion regarding the United States being a part of a multilateral force in Sudan to end the
ethnic genocide, as in 2004, 61% of Americans favored it and in 2007, 45% favored it.
Case Study: Libya, 2011
In 1969, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi led a coup that removed King Idris al-Sanusi I, a
British supported leader, from being the leader of Libya and Quad Affi himself inherited the
ruling power of the country (Kafala, 2011). During his forty-two years of ruling, Qaddafi made
changes that were considered radical to the previous government, as he started a new cultural
revolution in 1973. By banning private enterprises, public foreign investments, and private
foreign investments, along with squandering the right to freedom of speech, Qaddafi
implemented a socialist government which led to sharp economic decline (Kafala, 2011). Libyan
socialism did provide free education, healthcare, transport, and subsidized housing, but wages
are extremely low for the general public. On top of these policy changes, Qaddafi's regime was
openly murdering those civilians in Libya and abroad who were against his policies (Kafala).
Figure 2.
Timeline of President Obama’s Actions in Libyan Humanitarian Crisis

The Arab Spring, anti-government civilian protests and uprisings that started in Tunisia
and spread to Arab nations in the Middle East and North Africa, led to the Libyan civil war in
2011. The Arab Spring, which started in 2010, was seeing success in ousting disliked leaders,
such as the Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
(Holmes 2020). Muammar Qaddafi, the leader of Libya at the time, had taken away basic human
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rights from his people, abused their wealth, and detained or killed those who opposed him
(White House Archives, March 2011). Inspired by Tunisia and Egypt, the Libyan people started
protesting the government in hopes to take back their basic freedoms, but Qaddafi responded by
forcefully attacking them. Although the international community condemned the actions of
Qaddafi, he launched military operations through the use of ground forces and air assaults
against the Libyan people, where hospitals and civilians were targeted; journalists were detained
and killed; water, food, and energy supplies were shut off from the people; and mosques and
housing were destroyed (White House Archives, March 2011).
Before President Obama made an official statement about the Libyan conflict, the Pew
Research Center surveyed 1,001 Americans on March 10, 2011. When asked if they would favor
or oppose the United States and its allies increasing economic and diplomatic sanctions on
Libya, 51% favored the sanctions, 40% opposed the sanctions, and 9% “did not know” or refused
to answer (Public Wary of Military Intervention in Libya, Pew Research 2011). Furthermore,
when they were asked if they would favor or oppose the United States enforcing a “no-fly zone”
over Libya, 44% favored the action, 45% opposed the action, and 11% “did not know” or refused
to answer (Public Wary of Military Intervention in Libya, Pew Research 2011). At this point,
only an estimate of three hundred Libyans were killed, showing that the violence was limited
(“Libya Protests: Defiant Gaddafi Refuses to Quit,” 2011).
President Barack Obama addressed the American public about the ongoing crisis on
March 18, 2011, saying that the United Nations Security Council, which includes the United
States, had imposed an arms embargo and sanctions on the regime. They warned that Qaddafi
would be held accountable for his actions if the terror did not stop, but he only amplified his
attacks and threatened Benghazi, a Libyan city that had a population of 700,000 at the time
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(White House Archives, March 18, 2011). Qaddafi called on his supporters, “those who love
Muammar Qaddafi,” to come out of their homes and attack rebels in their dens (“Libya Protests:
Defiant Gaddafi Refuses to Quit,” 2011). Qaddafi assured the people of Benghazi that he would
“cleanse Libya house by house” of rebels and protesters trying to divide Libya (“Libya Protests:
Defiant Gaddafi Refuses to Quit,” 2011). This threat was a turning point for President Obama, as
it made it clear that Qaddafi was thinking about committing more large-scale atrocities, which
would make the humanitarian crisis worse, create regional instability, and destroy values of
democracy (White House Archives, March 18, 2011). Thus, the decision to create a strong
response to the regime’s actions through the United Nations was essential to specifically protect
civilians and hold Qaddafi accountable. These were the two clear and primary goals of the
United States (White House Archives, March 18 2011).
In response to a call from the Arab League and the Libyan people, the United Nations
Security Council, with the United States taking the lead, authorized the use of force to stop the
killing of civilians and to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya, while demanding the end to violence
(White House Archives, March 18, 2011). President Obama assured the people that the use of
force was not the desired American response, ground troops will not be deployed, and the United
States would not be working alone, as their British allies, French allies, and the Arab League
were prepared to enforce the resolution (White House Archives, March 18, 2011). Although
there was indecisiveness among the public, forceful action was taken by the international
coalition on March 19, 2011.
Days after the airstrikes occurred, Gallup Poll measured Americans' approval of
President Obama’s decision. 1,010 Americans were asked if they approved or disapproved of the
current military actions taken against Libya and 47% of Americans approved of the military
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action, whereas 37% opposed it (Jones, 2011). 16% had no opinion on the issue (Jones, 2011).
Five months later, in September of 2011, the Pew Research Center surveyed 1,001 Americans on
the previous military actions in Libya. When asked if the United States and its allies made the
right or wrong decision in conducting airstrikes in Libya, 44% said they made the right decision,
33% said they made the wrong decision, and 23% “did not know” or refused to answer (Pew
Research Center 2011).
Throughout the quick progression of the decision making to act militaristically in Libya,
it was found that the American public had a consistent stance on the United States’ actions, but
there was no overwhelming majority in favor of using military force. In regards to the motives of
the American people’s opinions on military intervention, it was found from the Pew Research
Center survey conducted before the airstrikes that only 20% of Americans believed that the
United States had a moral obligation to stop the violence in Libya (Pew Research Center, March
2011). The respondents were asked which was the best argument for using military force in
Libya and 32% said that it shows the United States backs democracy and 21% of Americans said
that removing Qaddafi would win support of the Libyan people (Pew Research Center, March
2011). Although many were against militaristic intervention, it can be seen from this poll that the
highest percentage believed that the best reason to intervene militaristically was to back
democracy. In liberalism, it is in the national interest of the United States to uphold and fight for
democracy in the international community, as the focus of national interest in liberal theory is to
create and enhance peace between nations (Manan). The United States aligned with the liberal
view as promoting a democratic nation in North Africa would ensure more peace and stability in
the region. Additionally, the respondents were asked which would be the best argument for not
using military force in Libya. 51% said that the military was already overcommitted, 19% said
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that the opposition groups may be worse than the current government, and 13% said that Libya is
not an American vital interest (Pew Research Center, March 2011). Of these arguments,
Americans believed that overcommitting the military is the best reason as to why the United
States should not intervene in Libya. This is a defensive realist national interest motive, as the
American public believed that the United States should not risk the security of other interests.
Case Study: Syria, 2013
In 2000, Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father, Hafez al-Assad, becoming the new
President of Syria. Syria had been under authoritarian control under Hafez al-Assad and Syrians
hoped that Bashar al-Assad would break away from this trend, but oppression continued (“Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad: Facing Down Rebellion,” 2020). Assad played with the idea of
implementing new reforms, such as battling corruption, modernizing the economy, and allowing
for a more democratic government. In 2001, he released over six hundred political prisoners,
allowed for independent newspapers to begin publishing after three decades of oppression, and
reformers were allowed to hold public meetings to discuss new policy (“Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad: Facing Down Rebellion,” 2020). These small and newfound freedoms, known as the
“Damascus Spring,” were short lived. The independent newspapers were shut down and political
meetings were outlawed again. The liberal economic policies that were implemented only
benefited a narrow group of elites (“Syrian President Bashar al-Assad: Facing Down Rebellion.”
2020). Seeing the impact of the Arab Spring movements in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, along
with experiencing freedoms being restored and then taken again only fueled Syrians with anger
and the desire for consistent change, which led to hopeful riots and protests in March of 2011.
But these protests only led to the start of the Syrian Civil War. The Syrian military put down
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protests with force, arrested and tortured civilians, and open fired on unarmed groups, which
created more internal fighting and international condemnation (Laub 2021).
Figure 3.
Timeline of President Obama’s Actions in Syrian Humanitarian Crisis

On August 18, 2011, President Obama released a statement calling for Bashar al-Assad to
“step aside” as the Syrian leader (Phillips 2011). The brutal onslaught against civilians who
wanted a peaceful transition to a democratic government showed the absolute lack of respect that
the regime had for its people. President Obama stated that the United States understood that the
country did not want foreign intervention, but the country would continue to support them in
their fight for universal rights and the building of democratic institutions (Phillips 2011). To urge
al-Assad to step down, Executive Order 13582 was signed the same day, prohibiting new
American investment in Syria, exports of all American products and services to Syria, and
imports to the United States of Syrian oil (Phillips 2011). On August 20, 2012, when it was
suspected that the Syrian government was producing internationally illegal chemicals, President
Obama stated that the use of chemical or biological weapons would call for the United States to
change its calculations on how to respond, as chemical warfare puts risks the stabilization of
American allies in the region, not only Syria (Remarks by the President to the White House Press
Corps, 2012). This was President Obama’s “red line” (Remarks by the President to the White
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House Press Corps, 2012). In April of 2013, the Pew Research Center surveyed 1,003 Americans
regarding the Syrian conflict. When asked if the United States and its allies should take military
action in Syria if it was found that chemical weapons were used against the Syrian people by
their own government, 45% of Americans were in favor of using military force, 31% of
Americans were opposed to it, and 23% “did not know” or refused to answer (Modest Support
for Military Force if Syria Used Chemical Weapons, Pew Research 2013).
On August 21, 2013, the al-Assad regime unleashed the chemical sarin gas against its
people, which has been deemed a weapon of mass destruction under international law (Laub
2021). It is at this point where President Obama releases a statement saying that he believed the
United States needed to take military action against the regime, but only if Congress approved it
(“Obama Seeks Approval by Congress for Strike in Syria,” 2013). Not responding was seen as
risk to American national security, basic human dignity, and American allies (Statement by the
President on Syria 2013). The forceful action proposed was said to be “limited in duration and
scope”, would not include putting military forces on the ground to intervene in the civil war, and
would be targeted to degrade the al-Assad regime’s capacity to carry out the use of chemical
weapons (Statement by the President on Syria 2013). Days after the chemical strikes, the Pew
Research Center conducted a poll and surveyed 1,000 Americans. When asked if there was clear
evidence that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons against civilians, 53% of
respondents said that there was clear evidence, 23% said that there was not clear evidence, and
24% “did not know” or refused to answer (“Public Opinion Runs Against Syrian Airstrikes,”
2013). Additionally, they were asked if they would be in favor or oppose the United States
conducting military airstrikes against Syria in response to the government using chemical
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weapons. Only 29% favored airstrikes, 48% opposed them, and 23% “did not know” or refused
to answer (“Public Opinion Runs Against Syrian Airstrikes,” 2013).
In the end, President Obama did not ask for Congress’ approval and airstrikes on targeted
Syrian chemical sites were not authorized, as the United States and Russia came to a diplomatic
agreement where both countries would denounce the use of chemical weapons, pressure al-Assad
to reveal his chemical sites, allow the removal of the weapons by the United Nations, and allow
for a United Nations enforcement mechanism (Strobel and Karouny 2013). Overall, it can be
seen that there was a change in support for military force against the al-Assad regime if chemical
weapons were used. In April of 2013, before the chemical attack occurred, there was a plurality
of Americans who were in favor of the United States and its allies using military force if any
chemical weapons were unleashed. Yet, when the chemicals were authorized and used against
the Syrian people, the plurality changed to being opposed to using military force.

Discussion
Analysis of the Motivations of Each Humanitarian Intervention
It was expected that the literature on the different objectives of the four types of
humanitarian interventions from Seybolt (2007) would reveal the motivations of the public and
the President supporting militaristic intervention, but this assumption was shown to be false. I
assumed that specific goals and considerations would be particularly attached to a national
interest or a moral motive. By looking at the objectives in each case study, national interest or
moral motives for militaristic intervention were not apparent, as the objectives are too general to
explain why the goal of intervention was established. In each case study, the question of why the
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goal was established was left unanswered, showing categorizing the type of humanitarian
intervention is not enough information to understand the motives behind the intervention.
In the Sudan case study, the public wanted the United States to use military force to stop
the murders that occurred in Darfur, Sudan. This military force that the majority was in favor of
included a “boots on the ground” approach. Therefore, the public’s wanted intervention approach
had the goal of either saving the victims or defeating the perpetrators, as the strategies of offense,
defense, and compellence would have been necessary to stop the genocide. Ultimately, this
approach was not the response that the United States took. Instead, President Bush decided to use
a strategy that avoided conflict unless it was in defense. The focus of President Bush’s approach
was to provide essential supplies to the people of Sudan and to protect those peacekeeping
operations delivering the supplies in the conflict torn region. The strategy used involved
deterrence and defense, meaning that the use of force was only used if any of the perpetrators
were trying to disrupt, damage, or take supplies provided for those suffering. The application of
Seybolt’s (2007) objectives and strategies to the Sudan case study does not explain the motives
behind President Bush deciding to take the route that protected aid delivery or the public’s desire
to militaristically intervene in Sudan. It allows for moral arguments to be made as to why the
public wanted militaristic intervention and why President Bush did not, as they could have been
out of national interest or morality, but there is no information through the strategies or goals that
explain the motive further.
Similarly in the case of Libya, the public and the President had different approaches for
humanitarian intervention. The majority of the American public did not want the United States to
authorize a militaristic humanitarian intervention in Libya, showing that the public wanted to
take an avoidance of conflict approach. President Obama thought otherwise and the outcome of
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the Libya case study shows that the objective taken was to save the victims and the strategies
used were deterrence and defense, as the airstrikes allowed for area protection around Benghazi.
Again, by simply looking at these objectives and strategies, it only allows for assumptions.
Research can assume that protecting the people of Benghazi was out of moral obligation or it can
assume that it was in the United States’ best interest security wise to act militarily. Thus, it is not
possible to understand what the motives were behind the goals, again showing that Seybolt’s
(2007) model cannot prove the motivations of national interest or moral obligation.
The case of Syria depicted Seybolt’s (2007) first type of humanitarian intervention, as the
goal was to assist in delivering aid and the strategy taken was to avoid conflict. Avoiding conflict
was the ultimate strategy agreed to by both the public and President Obama, but when the public
found out about the potential of a chemical attack in Syria, a plurality of Americans thought that
the goal of saving the victims with the strategies of deterrence, defense, and compellence were
best. Furthermore, when the chemical attack occurred, President Obama considered saving the
victims as the best goal when he planned on asking Congress for approval on the airstrikes, but
diplomatic opportunities came before that was necessary. Although the idea of a chemical attack
creates an assumption that intervention is needed to protect the lives of the civilians, a moral
motive, there is also an assumption that there is a motive to protect American or regional
security, which is a national interest motive. Seybolt’s (2007) model allows for these
assumptions, but there is no way to find the true motive of wanting the militaristic intervention.
Thus, research has to dissect public opinion polls and language in the president's speeches to
establish a national interest or moral motive.
Analysis of National Interest and Moral Obligation
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In all three cases, it is seen that national interest or moral obligation were factors in the
public’s opinion and the American President’s opinion to intervene with military force, but one
weighed more than the other in each case. The case of genocide in Darfur, Sudan showed that the
American public had a sense of responsibility to intervene and should use military force
compared to the cases of Libya and Syria, which showed that the public did not believe the
United States had a responsibility nor should use force. The language of the polls, referring to the
term “responsibility,” raises the idea of obligation out of some type of motive. National interest
did not seem to be the motive, as President Bush focused on the killing and brutal treatment of
civilians in his speeches. He appealed to the moral side of the issue. This case was a moral issue
to the public, also. A 2007 poll of 1,044 Americans from the Pew Research Center asked about
the public’s news interest of the genocide in Darfur (“Democratic Leaders Face Growing
Disapproval, Criticism on Iraq”). From 2004 to 2007, when respondents were asked if they
followed the ethnic violence in the Darfur region of Sudan very closely, fairly closely, not too
closely, or not at all closely in the news, majority of respondents either answered “not that
closely” or “not at all closely” (“Democratic Leaders Face Growing Disapproval, Criticism on
Iraq”). Furthermore, in the International Crisis Group 2005 survey of 1,000 Americans, 80% of
respondents said that the Sudanese attacks “are crimes against humanity or genocide” (“Do
Americans Care About Darfur”). With little knowledge on what was occurring in Darfur through
the news, with many thinking that there was too little coverage of the violence in the region and
a majority did not follow it closely, it shows that the motivator of humanitarian intervention was
moral duty (“Democratic Leaders Face Growing Disapproval, Criticism on Iraq”). Shifting from
a majority to a plurality from 2005 to 2007, the American people believed that the United States
should contribute troops to stop the violence with very little knowledge about the background
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and factual information about the crisis. All they heard was the term “genocide” being used by
the American government. Darfur is a great example of how use of the term genocide is a trigger
word that causes Americans to feel as if they have a moral responsibility to intervene in
humanitarian crises. Although American public opinion showed that a majority wanted military
intervention out of moral obligation, the American President decided not to respond in this way,
making his decision not align with public opinion. President Bush not ordering a militaristic
intervention aligns with the expectation that if both the public and the president’s motive was
based on moral obligation, then there would be no militaristic intervention.
Regarding national interest in Libya and Syria, President Obama used national interest
motivators to persuade the American people that military intervention on humanitarian grounds
were necessary. For the crisis in Libya, President Obama discussed how the humanitarian crisis
that would ensue after Qaddafi's large scale attack on his people would create destabilization in
the region, endanger American allies in the region, and it would rid of democratic values that are
trying to grow in the region (“Remarks by President on Situation in Libya,” March 18, 2011).
After the international coalition bombed Qaddafi's troops going towards Benghazi and in
neighboring cities and Qaddafi's air defenses to allow for supplies to be spread to the Libyan
people and prevent a large scale attack on Benghazi, President Obama attempted to persuade the
American people that this was the best choice for the United States’ national interest, although
the American public did not initially want a militaristic interventionist response (“Remarks by
President on Situation in Libya,” March 28, 2011). He notes that the United States has been a
defender of human rights and freedom for generations, but when specific American national
interest and values are at stake, action is necessary (“Remarks by President on Situation in
Libya,” March 28, 2011). Again it is shown that President Obama partially had a moral duty to
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help the people of Libya, as he wanted to save the people in Benghazi, but national interest was
the primary motive that called for action. This case study aligns with the expectations that if the
American president sees a national interest motivator in addition to a moral motivator,
militaristic intervention will occur. It also aligns with the claim that public opinion does not truly
influence decision making for humanitarian interventions. A plurality of Americans believed that
the best argument for the United States using military force in Libya was to show that the United
States backs democracy in the international community (Pew Research, March 10, 2011).
Upholding democracy is a national interest motive. Therefore, both the president and the public
had national interest motivators to intervene, yet since the president has the necessary condition
of national interest, public opinion did not matter in the decision.
The Syria case study is an outlier regarding the expectations. Although President Obama
saw many national interest motivators that he saw fit to militaristically intervene, a diplomatic
route was taken. President Obama explained to the American public that by militaristically
intervening in Syria, human rights abuses, failing democracy, regional destabilization, mass
refugee flows, and the use of internationally deemed weapons of mass destruction would be
prevented (“Statement by President Obama on Syria,” April 22, 2011). Even with proof of the
use of sarin gas, the American public did not see it fit to intervene militaristically, as airstrikes
would likely lead to long-term commitment in Syria (Gallup, August 29, 2013). This worry
about military commitment is an instrumental calculation used for national interest and the
public weighed the cost and benefits of intervention. In the end, both the public and the president
had national interest motives, but they each weighed the costs and benefits differently, as the
public saw the cost of intervention being too high and the president saw the benefit of
intervention being higher than the costs. The role of the public having an impact on the decision
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making to intervene is interesting in this case, as the public received the outcome that they
wanted. This was not seen in the two previous cases.

Analysis of the Formation of Public Opinion on Intervention
According to the literature, there are two prominent claims as to why humanitarian
interventions occur. The first claim, presented by Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, say that the
most prominent motivator of interventions are instrumental calculations (Limits of International
Law, 2005). Instrumental calculations include national interest and the cost of interventions
(Limits of International Law, 2005). The second claim, presented by Finnemore (2003), says that
moral obligation is at the forefront of public opinion for humanitarian intervention as the
evidence of humanitarian crises are sufficient for intervention (The Purpose of Intervention:
Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force). The case studies chosen show that instrumental
calculations and moral obligations both are factors in the decision making of whether to
intervene or not. In each case study, instrumental calculations and moral motives were found in
all areas of public opinion, but each motivator is weighed differently on a case by case basis. For
example, in the Sudan case, genocide caused for moral obligations to be at the forefront of public
opinion, as the term genocide immediately triggers a moral obligation to save the victims. In the
Libya and Syria case on the other hand, national interest was at the forefront of public opinion,
as the cost-benefit analysis of committing the American military was important. Therefore, the
expectation of instrumental calculations playing a role in the formation of public opinion did
align, but the research found that it is not solely the use of instrumental calculations to form
public opinion, as the calculations can be mixed with moral obligation.
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Some scholars believed that the American public’s opinion was unreliable as they would
simply follow the beliefs of politicians and would change their stance on issues without
substantive reasoning (Almond 1950, Lipset 1966). Yet, from 2003 to 2013, it can be seen that
the public had differing views than the American President. Although mainly seen in the Sudan
and Libya studies, this also was seen in the case of Syria. The American public in both the Sudan
and Libya cases had differing views from the American President on how to approach each
crisis. In the Syria case, it is initially shown that the American public and the President had
differing views, but a diplomatic opportunity opened up to allow the President to choose the
public’s approach. This simply shows growth in American democracy, as after half a century
from Almond (1950) and Lipset’s (1966) research, Americans have been able to become more
involved in politics and self-reliant in their thinking.
The second claim, that the public changed its view on foreign policy issues without
substantive reasoning, is also not supported in the cases examined. Although in the cases of
Libya and Syria there were noticeable changes in opinion, the reasoning was structured and was
rational. In April of 2012, before the chemical weapons unleashed in Syria, 45% of Americans
were in favor of the United States and its allies taking military action if it was confirmed that
chemicals were used (Pew Research Center, “Modest Support for Military Force if Syria Used
Chemical Weapons”). After the chemical attack on August 21, 2013, American support for
military assistance dropped to 29% even though 53% of Americans believed that there was clear
evidence that chemical weapons had been used against civilians by the Syrian government (Pew
Research Center, “Public Opinion Runs Against Syrian Airstrikes”). During this time, the
United States military was committed overseas in Afghanistan and the United States had just left
Iraq in 2011. A public opinion poll showed that Americans had substantive reasoning for
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changing their views, as 61% of Americans believed that airstrikes would cause the United
States to likely have a long term commitment in Syria and 74% of Americans believed that the
United States and its allies would receive backlash from the region (Pew Research Center,
“Public Opinion Runs Against Syrian Airstrikes''). This aligns with the idea that public opinion
on foreign policy is analytical and effective, which supports scholars Benjamin Page (1992),
Robert Shapiro (1992) and Samuel Popkin (1994) claims from the presented literature.

Conclusion
Findings
So, does American public opinion influence the President of the United States’ decision
to militarily intervene in humanitarian crises? As expected, the answer is no. It was revealed
through this research that if the American president has a national interest motive supporting
militaristic intervention, then it is possible that a militaristic intervention will be authorized. The
national interest motive is necessary, but not sufficient. This means that simply because there is a
national interest motivator does not mean that militaristic intervention is definitely going to
occur. The research is unable to explain what the president’s sufficient condition is, or what will
produce the outcome of militaristic intervention, but there is an assumption that can be made.
There was one case study that was proven to be an outlier: Syria. This case was the only case that
showed the intention of President Obama asking Congress for approval, showing that public
opinion would have been taken into account as the votes of Congress would have reflected their
constituents views. Additionally, the Syria case had a successful diplomatic outcome, which then
removed the need for a militaristic response. It is possible that the sufficient condition is the
success rate of obtaining a diplomatic agreement to resolve a humanitarian crisis. This sufficient
condition would also explain the militaristic intervention in Libya. With necessary conditions of
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national interest motives at stake, along with the sufficient condition of the small likelihood that
Qaddafi would come to an agreement with the members of NATO, it called for the United States
and NATO to militaristically intervene. This assumption does not apply to the Sudan case, as
moral obligation was the sole motive. Therefore, there was no necessary condition.
In addition to the two main findings, the research found three smaller findings. The first
is that simply looking at the type of humanitarian intervention does not reveal the motives behind
the intervention due to humanitarian crises being unique in each situation and the goal of the
interventions in a generalized sense are too broad to have a motive attached. Second, public
opinion is not only formed by either instrumental calculations or moral obligations, as they both
can be present. It is typical that either the instrumental calculation or the moral obligation weighs
more than the other, but both are still present when forming opinions. Lastly, the motive of moral
obligation alone will not incite militaristic intervention. Moral obligation is neither a necessary
or sufficient condition for militaristic humanitarian intervention, but the motive can be present
with both the national interest motive and the sufficient condition. Therefore, it shows that it can
play a role in deciding to militaristically intervene, but it would not be the primary reason.
Limits
This research is extremely relevant to today’s international community and the crises that
are happening around the world. Although the Russia-Ukraine war is of high interest currently,
this research can extend to all future humanitarian crises that threaten United States interests
specifically. Also, while the case studies consisted of crises in countries in the Middle East and
Africa, this study can be applied to crises in any country. Militaristic humanitarian interventions
that threaten American interests are irregular, causing there to not be a reliable trend. This
research was done with a specific question about the American public’s opinions on the United
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States’ decision to militaristically intervene in a humanitarian crisis. Thus, this research will only
apply to cases where the United States is the actor deciding to intervene.
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